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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

MARVIN W. HANSEN and
BEVERLY M. HANSEN,
Plaintiffs and
Appellants,

/
/

vs.

/

REUEL S. KOHLER and
DOLORES M. KOHLER, his wife,

/

Defendants and
Respondents,
EARSEL G. PIERCE and
PATRICIA B. PIERCE, his wife,
Intervening Defendants
and Cross Claimants.

Case No. 14099

/
/
/

BRIEF OF INTERVENING DEFENDANTS AND RESPONDENTS

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF CASE
Identification of the parties to the action herein shall
be made by referring to Marvin W. Hansen and Beverly M. Hansen,
Plaintiffs and Appellants as "Hansens"? to Reuel S. Kohler and
Dolores M. Kohler, Defendants and Respondents as "Kohlers"; and
to Earsel G. Pierce and Patricia B. Pierce, Intervening Defendants,
Cross Claimants and Counterclaimants and Respondents as "Pierces".

Hansens brought action in the Lower Court against
Kohlers seeking an Order of the Court compelling the Kohlers
to reconvey certain real property at Howell, Utah, to Hansens,
or in the alternative, that the Kohlers pay the Hansens
$7,500.00, together with commission and interest, and that
said amount be a lien upon the property recorded in the
name of the Pierces.

Hansens filed a Notice of Lis Pendens

with the County Recorder wherein the property at Howell
was situated at the time when the property had been conveyed
by Kohlers to Pierces.

Pierces entered the action as Interven-

ing Defendants, Cross Claimants, and Counterclaimants alleging
a loss of profits resulting from the loss of vendibility
of the property purchased by Pierces from Kohlers because
of the filing of the Lis Pendens of the Hansens; that the
conduct of the Hansens was outrageous and intolerable under
contemporaneous community standards, and that said acts were
wilfully and maliciously done, thereby seeking damages for the
distress, anxiety, and anguish inflicted upon the Pierces; the
Pierces seeking to recover from Hansens punitive and exemplary
damages, as well as attorney's fees proximately resulting from
the conduct of the Hansens.
The Pierces sought to recover from the Kohlers Attorney
-2-

fees and Court costs for the defense of the title given by
Warranty Deed by the Kohlers to the Pierces resulting from
the cause of action alleged by the Hansensf and further, for
any other damages as may result and imposed upon the Pierces
as the consequence of the claim of the Hansens.
DISPOSITION OF THE CASE BY THE LOWER COURT
The cause of action by Hansens as against Kohlers
was dismissed with prejudice and on its merits as no cause
of action.
The Cross Claim of the Cross Claimants, Pierces,
as against Kohlers was dismissed with prejudice and on the
merits as no cause of action.
The cause of action as set forth in the Counterclaim
of Pierces was granted allowing Judgment in favor of Pierces
and against Hansens in the sum of $4,166.05.
On Motion for New Trial by Hansens, the Court reaffirmed
its previous Judgment but modified the Judgment as to money
and damages allowed to Pierces with the reduction of the
Judgment to the sum of $2,596.75.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Hansens seek reversal of the Judgment of the Lower
Court granted in favor of Kohlers and against Hansens and
-3-

Hansens further seek reversal of the Judgment in favor of
Pierces and against Hansens.
Pierces seek a modification of Judgment in favor of
Pierces and against Hansens restoring the original Judgment
of the Lower Court, wherein the Court awarded loss of profit
on sale of home to Pierces and, on Judgment for New Trial,
modified the Judgment by reducing same and disallowing $1,500*00
previously awarded to Pierces for loss of profit on sale of
home and Pierces further seek modified Judgment awarding punitive, exemplary and personal damages.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Pierces will not make any statement of facts as
pertains to the original action as between the Hansens and
Kohlers, in that the statement of facts by Hansens and the
statement of facts by Kohlers should be adequate to inform
the Court.
Kohlers did convey to the Pierces the home and property
in Howell, Utah, by a Warranty Deed, which was recorded with
the County Recorder as of October 18, 1971, together with a
Real Estate Mortgage given to the Farmers Home Administration
(Exhibits 12, 14). On October 19, 1971, a Lis Pendens was
recorded by Hansens as against the same property conveyed
-4-

previously by Kohlers1 Warranty Deed to Pierces (Exhibit 16).
Mr. Pierce's employment was terminated at Thiokol in
December of 1972 (R-161), at which time he went to Little
Rock, Arkansas, for purposes of employment (R-161), having
first entered into an Earnest Money Agreement for the sale
of the Howell home and property to Mr. and Mrs. Nicholas
CR-61.«- R-63, Exhibit 17), and for a consideration in the
sum of $12,300.00, which Agreement was entered into March 28,
1972.
Pierces discovered for the first time that a Lis Pendens
had been filed against their home and property as a result
of an attempt to complete the sale of the property to the
Nicholases when a title search resulted in the revealing of
the Lis Pendens. (R-217)
The Farmers Home Administration refused to make a loan
to the Nicholases for purchase of the property because of
the filed Lis Pendens (R-217), even though the loan had previously
been approved by the Federal Housing Administration to the
Nicholases.

Title insurance would not be issued by the title

insurance company because of the Lis Pendens (R-51) and upon
advice of Attorney Dale M. Dorius as counsel for the Nicholases,
the Nicholases would not consummate the sale because of the
Lis Pendens and the refusal of F.H.A. to approve the purchase
-5-

of the real property (R-217), and the Nicholases resided in
the home for eight months without payment of rent while attempting to await clearance of title to property so that they could
purchase the property from Pierces (R-1611.
Subsequent to Nicholases moving from the property after
an eight-month occupancy, a new buyer was obtained by the
Realty Company on behalf of Pierces, but after three months
occupancy, the new purchasers also could not buy the property
because of the pending Lis Pendens. (R-208, -209)
ARGUMENT
POINT I
RECORDING OF LIS PENDENS CONSTITUTED SLANDER OF TITLE
The Supreme Court of Utah in Olsen vs. Kidman/ 235
P.2d 510, (Sept., 1951), adopted the Rule set forth in Gudger
vs. Mantan, 21 Cal.2d 537, 134 P.2d 217, as to what constituted
an action of slander of title when the Court adopted the
California ruling by restating:
Slander of title is effected by anyone, who, without
privilege, publishes untrue and disparaging statements with respect to the property of another, under
such circumstances as would lead a reasonable person
to foresee that a prospective purchaser or lessee thereof
might abandon his intentions. ***lt is an invasion of
the interest of the vendibility of property. In order
to commit the tort, actual malice or ill will is unnecessary.
-6-

The Utah Court by its holding in the Olsen vs. Kidman
case, supraf specifically clarified the previous ruling of
the Court in Dowse vs. Doris Trust Company, 208 P.2d 956/
and its holding in Sproul vs. Parks, 210 P.2d 436, wherein
the wrongful action of filing a Lis Pendens therein were
actuated by malice in fact/ by denying the allegation of
the Defendant and Appellant/ Leslie Kidman, that the Utah
cases and the law generally regarding slander of title require
that before liability can be found/ the Recorder of the slanderous document must have known that he asserted a false claim
without any foundation or right, by specifically stating
that in order to commit the tort, actual malice or ill will
is unnecessary.
In the instant matter before the Court/ there is no
allegation that there was specific malice at the time of
the filing of the Lis Pendens by the Hansens, but the record
does show that as a matter of fact/ that upon the Pierces
advising the counsel for Hansens, that the filing of the
Lis Pendens was preventing the sale of the property and injuring
the vendibility of such property by reason of the Lis Pendens
CR-109J, and by further pointing out to the Hansens and their
counsel, that at the time of the filing of the Lis Pendens
by the Hansens, that the property had already been conveyed

to the Pierces by Kohlers with a Warranty Deed and without
any knowledge on the part of the Pierces that there was any
claim by Pierces as against said property (R-173) at the
time of the purchase, that the continued refusal of the Hansens
and their counsel to remove their Lis Pendens, and in fact
not removing same until February 5, 1974, the day the actual
trial commenced in the District Court (R-175), which is the
action presently before this Court, that there, in fact,
would not be difficulty to find malice in fact on the part
of the Hansens and their counsel, in the guise of economic
duress and coercion by their continued failure and refusal
to remove a Lis Pendens against property, which at the time
of the recording of the Lis Pendens was in the name of the
Pierces, who were bona fide purchasers for value without
any knowledge whatsoever of any claim by the Hansens to said
property. (R-173)
This Court further pointed out in the Olsen vs.
Kidman case, supra, the citation in Clause B of the Restatement
of Torts, Section 6625, which states:
It is not necessary that the publisher of a disparaging
statement know or believe it to be false nor is it necessary
that as a reasonable man he should know or believe that
it is untrue. Furthermore, it is immaterial that he
has reasonable grounds for his belief in its truth. As
in an action for defamation, if the other essentials
to liability are present, the publisher of disparaging
matter takes the risk, that it is untrue.
-8-

The action before this Court is not one brought
for libel and slander through the use of words, which are
slanderous per se, but is based upon the recording of a document
which is false and untrue and is based upon the legal slander
of title, which prevented the Pierces from effecting the
sale of their property.
The Pierces purchased the property on October 18,
1971, (R-160, Exhibit 12) and the Lis Pendens was not removed
until February 5, 1974, (R-175) the property had previously
been conveyed by Hansens to Kohlers on April 2, 1969. (Pi.Ex.3)
Counsel for the Hansens voluntarily became a witness
in the action at time of trial and stated for the record, that
the Warranty Deed vesting ownership of the property in the
Pierces was filed prior to Hansens1 Lis Pendens (R-243),
and that said counsel, together with his client, Mr. Hansen,
visited the home of Pierces at Howell, Utah, and advised
Mrs. Pierce, who was home alone, "We got a lawsuit filed", (R243), and further admitted stating to Mrs. Pierce "If you're
ahead of us," and he indicated that they were, "then, I said,
I am behind you and you're ahead of me". (R-244)
Mrs. Pierce testified that Mr. Hansen and his counsel
came to the Pierces1 home in March, 1972, at which time Mrs. Pierce
showed Mr. Hansen and his counsel a copy of the Warranty Deed
-9-

conveying the property from Kohlers to Pierces and their
title insurance policy (R-97) (Int.Def. Ex. 12, 15), to which
Mr. Robbins responded by saying:
Well, I can show you the Lis Pendens we have filed
at the Courthouse. And proceeded to take it from
his brief case.* CR-971
It is submitted to the Court that the filing of
a Lis Pendens against property recorded in the name of a bona
fide purchaser for value who is not the Defendant of the
Complaint to which the Lis Pendens has reference constitutes
a slander of title.
POINT II
LIS PENDENS IS QUALIFIED PRIVILEGE
The Appellants, Hansens, have made a point in their
Brief to this Court, that the filing of their Lis Pendens was
privileged, in that it was part of a judicial procedure while,
at the same time, setting forth the facts that the Complaint
filed was against the Kohlers only and not against the Pierces,
and that the Lis Pendens filed was against property already
duly recorded and validly sold for a consideration to the
Pierces* CAppellant's Brief, p. 29, 311
Hansens quote from Albertson vs. Raboff/ 295 P.2d
4Q5, a California case, to state the premise that a Lis Pendens
is a privileged judicial proceedings, but the California case
-10-

law and statutory law does not protect one who makes a false
claim by filing a Lis Pendens against property other than
the party entitled or alleging ownership of such, real property
as in the instant matter before the Court.
The State of Utah has ruled to the contrary in a
matter such as the instant filing of Lis Pendens against
Pierces as set forth in Birch vs. Fuller, 337 P.2d 964, 6
Ut.2d 79. The Birch case is an action wherein a Lis Pendens
was filed, and as a result thereof, an action for slander
of title was instituted by the Plaintiff/ and the finding
in favor of the Plaintiff in the Lower Court was affirmed
by the Utah Supreme Court/ wherein the Court awarded to the
Plaintiff a money Judgment for slander of title/ the Court
stating:
Defendants say the evidence does not support a
slander of title action, nor does it evince bad
faith or malice. It is difficult to discern whatever motives Defendants had in filing the Lis
Pendens/ particularly in view of the transmission
by one of the Defendants of a rather insulting
letter to the Plaintiffs some two months earlier.
We believe the Court*s conclusion to have been
justified. Also, there appears to be no basis
for disturbing the Courtfs conclusion/ that the
Defendants had no legal or equitable title.
In the instant matter before the Court/ we already have
the judicial determination in the Lower Court/ that there was
absolutely no cause of action by Hansens as against Kohlers

which resulted in a forthwith dismissal of the cause of action
set forth by Hansens in the Lower Court, but in addition
thereto, there could be no question of the bad faith and
malice of the Hansens, in that there was an absolute refusal
to remove the Lis Pendens even with knowledge of the prior
recording of the Deed of the Pierces to the Lis Pendens of
Hansens, CR-243, -2461/ even though on three separate occasions
the Pierces sought to have Hansens remove the Lis Pendens
so that the property could be sold to an earnest money buyer.
(R-175)
It is the contention of the Hansens, that they would
have removed the Lis Pendens had they been asked to remove
same, while ignoring the evidence set forth in the record
wherein the Pierces testify that on three occasions they
attempted to have counsel for the Hansens remove the Lis
Pendens and the attitude of counsel is clearly evident in
his direct testimony in this matter, wherein he stated as
a witness, that he did not consider (R-103), that the filing
of a Notice of Intervention by the Pierces gave counsel for
the Hansens a clue that there might be desire on the part
of the Pierces to remove the Lis Pendens, and that even the
filing of the Complaint of the Pierces setting forth an action
of slander of title and a plea for damages for the loss of
-12-

vendibility of property did not appear to counsel as a request
for the removal of the Lis Pendens (R-103), and as a matter
of record, it is a fact that the Lis Pendens was not removed
until February 5, 1974, which was the day of the trial of
this action in the Lower Court. (R-175)
The contention.of the Hansens, that there is an
absolute privilege to file a Lis Pendens, has been answered
in the negative by the Utah Supreme Court in Olsen vs. Kidman,
supra, which is consistent with the law of the great weight
of authority as to such allegation of privilege.
In 39 A.L.R.2d 840, p. 843, there is an annotation
of cases under the heading:
The wrongful filing for a record of a document which
casts a cloud upon another's title to or interest in
realty is clearly such an act of publication as to
give rise to an action for slander of title, if provable damages result.
Under this heading, there are a large collection of cases from
the States of Alabama, California, Florida, Illinois, Iowa,
Kansas, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri,
Montana, New Jersey, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Texas, Utah,
Wyoming, Canada, and the Tenth Circuit Court of the United
States.
It has been further held in a series of cases, that
in an attempt to escape liability for slander of title on the
-13-

ground that the instrument alleged to have been wrongfullyrecorded did not in fact affect Plaintiffs' title, have been
generally unsuccessful, with the Courts usually taking the
view, that any wrongful recordation which would reasonably
give pause to the ordinary purchaser may be actionable.
This point of view has been expressed in Greenlake Investment
Company vs. Swarthout, 161 S.W.2d 697; also in First National
Bank vs. Moore, 7 S.W.2d 145, Texas Civil Appeal, 1928; Glimack
Oil Company vs. Weiner, 150 Kan. 430, 94 P.2d 309, (1939).
It is the direct testimony of Ronald W. Robbins,
who was County Supervisor for the Farmers Home Administration, United States Department of Agriculture, (R-211), who
testified that Pierces had a buyer, a Mr. Nicholas, who filed
application with F.H.A. on April 5, 1972, for the purchase
of the property, and that the loan was approved and a check
was issued in the amount of $11,500.00, which was the balance
due after downpayment for the purchase of the property from
the Pierces CR-217}, and that the sale did not go through
because of the Lis Pendens and the failure of the Pierces
to have it removed. CR-220, -221)
POINT III
PIERCES ARE ENTITLED TO ALL DAMAGES
OCCASIONED BY FILING OF WRONGFUL LIS PENDENS
The Restatement of the Law on Torts, Vol. 3, Sec. 624,
-14

p. 325, states:
One who, without privilege to do so, publishes
matter which is untrue and disparaging to another's
property and landf chattelsf or intangible things,
under such circumstances as would lead a resonable
man to foresee the conduct of a third person
as purchaser or lessee thereof might be determined,
thereby is liable for pecuniary loss resulting
to the other from the impairment of vendibility
thus caused.
Blacks Law Dictionary, 4th Ed., defines the term
of uvendibility" or to be "vendible" as being merchantable.
In the instant matter before this Court, the Pierces
had entered into an actual real estate contract for the sale
of their property tR-61, -63} (Def.Exh.17) and did not become
aware of the Lis Pendens on said property until a title check
was made by F.H.A. prior to delivering up of money in the
sum of $11,500.00 as and for the Purchase Money Agreement
of Nicholas for the purchase of the property of the Pierces
(R-68), and upon discovery of the Lis Pendens, F.H.A. upon
the recommendation of its attorney, Mr. Hatfield (R-217),
denied the loan and returned the check to be voided.
In Collins vs. Whitehead, 34 F. 121, the Court held,
that where the Plaintiff was desirous of selling his land
to obtain money for other undisclosed enterprises and was
hindered from doing so by the Defendants1 act, in filing
a record of papers stating that the Defendant had entered
-15-

into a valid, enforceable contract for the purchase of property,
was held sufficient to justify the allowance of substantial
general damages, although there was no proof of specific
damages, the Court saying that the injury to the Plaintiff
was real, since he was compelled to bring suit to remove
the cloud from his title, and in the interim, his property
was useless to him and that it would be a reproach to the law
to give him only nominal damages.
In the instant matter before this Court, there need
be no speculation as to the damages suffered by the Pierces.
Coley vs. Hecker, 206 Cal. 22, 272 P. 1045, was
an action wherein it was alleged that the Defendant maliciously
filed an Abstract of Judgment, purporting to constitute a
lien against Plaintiff's real estate at a time when the Defendant
knew the Judgment had been suspended by an Appeal Bond.

The

Court held that the allegation, that the malicious recordation
decreased the value of the real estate, had rendered it less
marketable was true, and that it was not necessary that Plaintiff
show that the wrongful act interferred with some special
opportunity to sell or deal with the land as might be true if
the acts complained were oral.
Davis vs. Wood, 61 Cal.App.2d 788, 143 P.2d 740, was
an action wherein the Defendant wrongfully recorded a notice of
-16-

location of a mining claim on land upon which Plaintiff held
a leasehold interest, thereby casting a cloud upon Plaintiff's
title.

It was alleged that the recording decreased the value

of the leasehold interest and rendered it unmarketable.
The Court held that it was not necessary that the Plaintiff
allege that a particular sale was lost because of the wrongful
acts, although on special demurrer, the Trial Court might
be justified in requiring the damages to be set forth with
greater particularity.
Greenlake Investment Company vs. Swarthout, 161
S.W.2d 697, was an action wherein the Defendant allegedly,
fraudulently, and in bad faith recorded a claim of lien on
the Plaintifffs real estate, and that as a result, a cloud
was cast upon the Plaintiff's title and sale of the property
was prevented and hindered.

The Plaintiff filed an action

seeking actual and punitive damages.

The Court held that

the Complaint stated a good cause of action, even though
there was no allegation that the Plaintiff suffered actual
damages, and the Court stated that on proof of the charges,
Plaintiff would be entitled to at least nominal actual damages,
and that if such allowance were made, punitive damages would
also be allowed.
Pierces in their Counterclaim alleged and proved the
reasonable attorney's fees in this matter should have been
-17-

$1,500.00 as to the Pierces, (R-319) and the record before
this Court makes obvious that such a fee is a most moderate
fee for the number of appearances, Motions, pleadings, and
Legal Memorandums that have been filed in this matter, and
that there is no need for apportionment of attorney's fees
as between the services rendered by the counsel for Pierces
as to the services necessitated by the action of Hansens,
in that the Kohler defense required no Depositions, and that
the great number of hearings on Motions and pleadings were
compelled by Attorney for Hansens rather than Attorney for
Kohlers.
Testimony given under oath by Attorney David J.
Knowlton reasonably set his services in at $650.00 for travel
and for actual trial held in the matter (R-152), which would
leave only $850.00 as the amount claimed by Attorney Pete N.
Vlahos, Esq., for the attending of the two Depositions, making
new Interrogatories, answering of pleadings, appearances before
the Lower Court on the various Motions made, research, and
making of Legal Memorandums, and interviewing of clients and
witnesses involved in the matter.
It is submitted to this Honorable Court, that recovering
of attorney's fees was established in Dowse vs. Doris Trust
Company, supra, wherein the Court stated:
-18-

Attorney's fees are certainly a reasonable expense
for litigation. Plaintiff testified that he
had some inquiries about the land, but had been
unable to sell the property with the Defendant's
instrument on record, and that was the reason
he brought the suit to quiet title. Defendant
did not deny that he had placed the instrument
on record, knowing that he did not have an enforceable contract by the land for the purpose of
preventing Plaintiff from mortgaging or selling
In the Statement of Facts herein set forth and
in the quotation and citation of the record as has been
done hereinabove, there is ample evidence that Hansens did
not have an enforceable contract against the land and have
not at any time reasonably explained why they did not timely
remove the Lis Pendens so that the damages would not have
occurred to the Pierces.
In the case of Olsen vs. Kidman, supra, this Court
affirmed the decision of the District Court of Box Elder
County and this Court reinstated the prayer of the Plaintiff
for attorney's fees when the Lower Court reduced the amount
for attorney's fees prayed for by the Plaintiff.

In Olsen

vs. Kidman, supra, the attorney testified as to what was
the reasonable fee for services which he performed against
which there was no cross examination*, and the Utah Supreme
Court stated that what is a reasonable compensation for
legal services as testified to by a party is not binding
upon the Trial Court, but is advisory only.
-19-

This Court further

found that the amount prayed for by the party-Plaintiff
and testified to by the attorney was a reasonable sum and
re-established the attorney's fees testified to in the Lower
Court.
There can be no doubt that this Court has taken
a stand as to whether or not the Petitioner is entitled
to the loss of profit in the sale of the property, and the
Court in Dowse vs. Doris Trust Company, supra, cited from the
Restatement of the Law of Torts, Sec. 633, pp. 347-348,
as follows:
The pecuniary loss for which a publisher of disparaging
matter is liable under the rules as stated in Sections
624 and 626 - 627 is restricted to:
Cal

That pecuniary loss which directly and immediately
results from the impairment of the vendibility
of a thing in question caused by publication of a
disparaging matter, and

(bL

The expense of litigation reasonably necessary
to remove the doubt cast by the disparagement
upon the other!s property and a thing or upon
the quality thereof.
The Court further stated its Rule of Law in the case

as follows:
Attorney's fees are certainly a reasonable expense
of litigation. Plaintiff testified that he had
some inquiries about the land, but had been unable
to sell the property with Defendant's instrument
on record, and that was the reason he brought
the suit to quiet title. Defendant did not deny
that he placed the instrument on record, knowing
that he did not have an enforceable contract by
-20-

the land, for the purpose of preventing Plaintiff
from mortgaging or selling it. Under such circumstances/ the Court did not err in directing a
verdict in favor of Plaintiff as to the tspecial
damages.
In the instant matter before this Court/ the testimony
before the Court revealed that there was a period of eight
months/ and during such period of timef no rent was paid
by the Nicholases who were the prospective purchasers for the
property while they were waiting for a valid title conveyance
to them of the property. (R-206/ -207)

It was further testified

by Mr. Robbins of the Farmers Home Administration/ that there
was an additional period of approximately five months wherein
said premises were vacant/ owing to the inability of the
parties to sell the land. (R-220)
It was further testified to by a real estate expert
CR-2061 and by the Pierces (R-164), that the premises had
a reasonable rental value of at least $95.00 a month.
The Court in its Judgment as rendered on December 15/
19.741 determined that a preponderance of the evidence showed
that as a direct and proximate cause of unfounded and unwarranted
filing of a Lis Pendens by Hansens and the refusal to remove
samef the Pierces incurred damages as follows:
(a) Out-of-pocket special damages in the total
amount of $1,196.75.
Cbl

Damages for the loss of sale of the real property
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in question in the amount of $1,500.00.
(c)

Damages for loss of rents concerning said real

property for a period of eight months at the rate of $50.00
per month for a total of $400.00.
(d)

Reasonable attorneyfs fees incurred in connection

with this proceeding in the amount of $1,000.00, for a total
verdict of $4,096.75, plus costs in the amount of $69.30,
for a total Judgment in the amount of $4,166.05. (R-464)
Following the verdict of the Court for the Pierces
and against Hansens, Hansens filed a Motion for a New Trial
(R-467), which was denied by the Court (R-497).
The Court subsequently filed a modification of its
Memorandum Decision and reduced the Judgment of the Pierces
disallowing the $1,500.00 that would have been realized by
the Pierces as a profit from the sale of the premises had
they been allowed to close the sale by removal of the Lis
Pendens by the Hansens, and the Court did thereby reduce
the Judgment to $2,596.75. CR-479).
The reasoning of the Court in reducing and denying
the $1,500.00 was based upon the Court finding that the price
paid for the property by Pierces was $11,570.00 rather than
$10,000.00 and did find that the price to be received on the
sale of the property would be $12,300.00, but alleged that the
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Pierces would have had to pay a sales commission and/ therefore,
they would not have realized any profit from the sale of
the home. (R-479)
The testimony of the Pierces clearly show that the
amount paid for the property was $10/500.00 (R-224) (Def.Exh.14),
and that the sale price for the property was $12/300.00. (R-163)
(Pef.Exh.171

The record further shows that there was expenditure

by the Pierces after the purchase of the home for improvements
made thereon and the Court has added the improvement costs
in and has then deducted a real estate commission of the
sale of property six percent for a sale which did not occur
but for which there could be liability to the Pierces by the
deduction logically/ that if the sale had occurred/ that that
would have reduced the profits.
It is submitted to the Court that the original Judgment
of the Court allowing the $lf500.00 profit of the sale of the
home by the Pierces to the Nicholases had it been consummated
was the damages suffered by the Piercesf and that there is
nothing in the record showing that there is no liability
upon the Pierces for payment to the realty agency of the sales
commission, and in addition/ the Hansens should not be able
to benefit by their own wrong by being given the benefit of
the bargain by a reduction in the loss of profits of the home
to the Pierces in said amount of $1/500.00.
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It is further a matter of record/ that the real
value established for the rental value of the home was in
a minimal sum of $95.00 (R-164, -2061, but that the Court
in entering its Judgment allowed only $50.00 a month rental
for eight months, that the Nicholases lived in the home without
any rental payments while waiting to obtain clear title by
Pierces obtaining a removal of the Lis Pendens from the Hansens,
and the Court should have awarded to the Pierces the reasonable
rental value of the property which was in the minimal sum
of $95.00 per month, and further, that the home was in limbo
for an additional five-month period (R-220), and that additional
rental for that five-month period at $95.00 a month should have
been awarded to the Pierces.
POINT IV
THE LOWER COURT SHOULD HAVE AWARDED ADDITIONAL DAMAGES
The Pierces in their Counterclaim and prayer alleged
that the conduct of the Hansens was outrageous and intolerable
under contemporaneous community standards and that the acts of
the Hansens in filing and failing to remove upon demand the
Lis Pendens was done maliciously and wilfully and that as a
direct and proximate result of the conduct, that the Pierces
suffered mental stress, anxiety, and anguish and prayed for
the sum of $10,000.00. (R-323)
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The Counterclaim and prayer of the Counterclaimants,
Pierces, further alleged that as a result of the wilful,
wanton, and malicious conduct of the Hansens, that the Pierces
were entitled to punitive and exemplary damages in the sum
of $5,000.00.
The legal basis for the first claim of the Pierces
is based upon the conduct of the Hansens as was exemplified
in the findings of this Court in the case of Samms vs. Eccles,
358 P.2 344, wherein this Court found that the conduct by
one that was outrageous and intolerable under contemporaneous
community standards and which was done maliciously and wilfully,
and wherein as a result thereof, the injured party suffered
mental distress, anxiety, and anguish, that an award of damages
should be made and so found in that action.
The claim of the Pierces as to the punitive and
exemplary damages is based upon the traditional findings
by this Court, that where one does a wrongful act which was
wilful, wanton, and malicious, that the awarding of punitive
damages is done to discourage future conduct of a like nature
by such persons.
There was no finding whatsoever in the Lower Court
as to either of these issues and it is the contention of
the Pierces, that the conduct enumerated in the Statement
of Facts above, and hereinbelow sumarized, warranted such
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a finding and Judgment*
Mr. Pierce's employment at Thiokol Chemical Corporation was terminated and in order to find additional employment
(R-161), he was compelled to move to Little Rock, Arkansas,
for the purpose of obtaining new employment (R-161).
The duty fell upon Mrs. Pierce to sell the home,
which she did by listing the property for sale with a realtor.
CDef.Exh.14)
There was no knowledge by either of the Pierces, that
there was any Lis Pendens or encumbrance upon their property
that would prevent resale of the property. (R-173, -188)
The episode hereinabove testified to by Mrs. Pierce
CR-96) and admitted by counsel for Hansens as a witness (R96) related the visitation by Mr. Hansen and his counsel to
the home of the Pierces, where Mrs. Pierce was confronted in
her home by Mr. Hansen and his attorney and advised that a
Lis Pendens had been filed and that a claim had been made
against the property of the Pierces (R-96), and that even
after showing to Mr. Hansen and his counsel a copy of a Warranty
Deed from Kohler, together with title insurance evidencing
that there was no claim of any kind against the property as
of the time of purchase of the property by Pierces from Kohlers,
that Hansen and counsel continued to stand fast on their Lis
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Pendens. (R-97), and that as a direct and proximate result
of said visitation, Mrs. Pierce was greatly upset, suffering
mental anguish and emotional distress and was left in tears
CR-991, and that upon advising her husband of the claim (R-99),
Mr. Pierce left his employment by quitting his job and coming
home to attempt to straighten out the allegation of the claim
by the Hansens. (R-168)
That the Pierces made a visitation to the office
of the counsel for Hansens, after first having spoken to
counsel for Kohler (R-169), and after advising counsel for
Hansens, that Pierces were being forced to move from the
State of Utah and had placed their home for sale and could
not sell it with the Lis Pendens pending against said property,
they were advised by counsel for Hansens, that they should
talk to their title insurance carrier. (R-174), and were
advised by the Pierces that they had already done that and
were advised by the title insurance carrier that at the time
of the issuing of the title policy, that the property was
unencumbered and did not have a Lis Pendens filed against
it and that, therefore, there was no liability on the title
insurance carrier for a Lis Pendens filed subsequent to a
policy of title insurance. (R-167)

To which counsel for

Hansens invited them to join in a suit, stating "the more the
-27-

merrier". (R-174)
Subsequent thereto, Mrs. Pierce joined her husband
and moved to Texas, where he had employment (R-168), believing
that some way the property could be sold regardless of the
Lis Pendens. (R-168)
Subsequent thereto with the failure of the earnest
money buyers who were residing in the Pierces' Howell home
for eight months and not paying any rent, waiting for issuance
of title to them (R-164, R-208), the Pierces made another
trip to Salt Lake City to speak to counsel for Hansens in
an additional attempt to have the Lis Pendens removed (R168), and advised Hansens and counsel that they were unable
to make the home payments and would lose the home without
being able to make a sale of the property to the Nicholases,
which was refused. (R-169)
This was in November, 1972, (R-168), the Pierces
engaged the present counsel in an attempt to obtain a removal
of the Lis Pendens and a Motion to File as Intervenor was
filed (R-309), and with the consent of the Court, a Counterclaim
and Cross Claim was filed by the Pierces in this matter.
(R-319)
Counsel for the Hansens compelled the attendance
of both the Pierces to come at their own expense from Texas to
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Lake City for purposes of Deposition (R-186), and the Pierces
attended at separate times in order to have one of the parents
home with their four children, both compelled to attend Depositions requested and ordered by counsel for Hansens. (R-186)
Both of the Pierces being employed in Texas. (R-178)
The Pierces, of course, were again compelled to
attend trial in Brigham City, again leaving their jobs and
this time their children with a babysitter for the purpose
of being present at a two-day trial. (R-186)
It is to be noted that the Lis Pendens was not removed
until the first day of the trial, which occurred on February 5,
1974, (R-l, R-175) and that a Warranty Deed conveyance of
the title to the property had been made by the Hansens to
Kohlers on April 2, 1969, with the Kohlers conveying by Warranty
Deed to the Pierces on October 18, 1971, and the Lis Pendens
being filed subsequent to that time (R-319).
It should further be noted by the Court, that a
foreclosure of the property was made (R-207) by Farmers Home
Administration for nonpayment and breach of Promissory Note
and a Mortgage by the Pierces.
It is submitted to this Honorable Court, that there
are adequate grounds to find that the conduct hereinabove set
forth by the Hansens, even if excusable for the original filing
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of a Lis Pendens by reason of a Complaint against the Kohlers,
which the Lower Court has found to be totally unfounded and
which not only destroyed the vendibility of the Pierces1
property, but caused them such great physical and economic
upheaval by the continued unreasoned, wilful, and wanton
refusal to remove the Lis Pendens, did constitute such conduct
as was outrageous and intolerable under contemporaneous community
standards, and that the subsequent acts of the Hansens was maliciously and wilfully done, and that as a direct and proximate
result of such conduct, that the Pierces did suffer mental
distress, anxiety, and anguish, and should have been entitled
to an award for such conduct, and further, that the Court
should have given notice to the Hansens of such arrogant
use of the Courts and of legal process which was totally
unfounded should have been deterred by an award of punitive
damages as well to the Pierces,
CONCLUSION
It is submitted to this Honorable Court, that the
modified Judgment of the Court in awarding the bare bone but
partial expenses and loss to the Pierces was at best a minimal
Judgment and that the original Judgment of the Court would
more reasonably have reflected the actual loss suffered by the
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Pierces and the Pierces should have been awarded the additional
$1,500.00 for loss of profit on the home, and further, that
this Court should give notice to the type of conduct herein
set forth by modification of the Judgment make an award to
the Pierces of the additional actual damages suffered by the
Pierces, as well as an addition for punitive and exemplary
damages, and that the Court should sustain the Judgment of
the Lower Court and modify the Judgment to reflect the actual
injury inflicted upon the Pierces.
DATED this

j% day of September, 1975.
Respectfully' submitted

sto?

DAVID J. KNOWLTON of VLAHOS & KNOWLTON

"U. VLAHOS Of VLAHOS & KNOWLTON
Attorneys for Intervening Defendants,
Cross Claimants and Respondents
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